The Problems of Proving Actual or Apparent Bias: An Analysis of Contemporary Developments in South Africa by L Juma & C Okpaluba
   
ISSN 1727-3781 
 
 
 
 
THE PROBLEMS OF PROVING ACTUAL OR APPARENT BIAS: AN ANALYSIS OF 
CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
2011 VOLUME 14 No 7 
Author: C Okpaluba and L Juma                                                     
http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/pelj.v14i7.2 
 
 C OKPALUBA AND L JUMA                                                   PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
 
14 / 261 
 
THE PROBLEMS OF PROVING ACTUAL OR APPARENT BIAS: AN 
ANALYSIS OF CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
*C Okpaluba 
 **L Juma
 
 
1  Introduction 
 
The major problem associated with allegations that a judge was biased or perceived 
to  have  been  prejudiced  is  the  inability  of  the  complainant  to  prove  the  facts  of 
adjudicative  partiality.  It  is  often  impossible  to  determine  with  any  measure  of 
precision  the  state  of  mind  of  an  adjudicator  who  has  rendered  a  verdict.  Thus, 
actual bias is an elusive proposition. Accordingly, the courts take the position that an 
appearance of impartiality is in itself an essential component of procedural fairness. 
Even so, the threshold of finding perceived bias is as high as where actual bias is 
alleged. Whenever an allegation of bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias is 
made,  the  adjudicative  integrity  not  only  of  the  individual  judge  but  of  the  entire 
administration of justice is called into question. The court must, therefore, consider 
the matter very carefully before making a finding.
1 
 
In order to ensure that fairness in the conduct of regular courts and administrative 
tribunals is maintained, the courts ask the question whether  or not  a reasonably 
informed  observer  wo uld  reasonably  perceive  bias  on  the  part  of  the  officer 
adjudicating the issue.
2 Clearly, therefore, unless the individual judge reveals by way 
of utterances or through conduct the inner working of her mind, it could be difficult to 
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1   See eg R v (DS) 1997 151 DLR (4
th) 193; Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada 2003 231 DLR (4
th) 
1 (Wewaykum); Ultracuts Franchises Inc v Wal-Mart Canada Corp 2005 MBQB 222 (CanLII) 
para 17.  
2   Per Cory J, Newfoundland Telephone Co v Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities 1992 89 
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guess what the judge, as a human being, has in mind.
3 Robert Stevens thus rightly 
describes impartiality as an ephemeral concept which has eluded both philosophers 
and psychologists as to its real meaning.
4  Much reliance is therefore placed on 
visible manifestations of impartiality.
5 The answer to the question of whether a judge 
is biased or her judgment tainted with the elements of bias would ultimately rest on 
subjective human conjecture or perception. 
 
However, public perception that a hearing was not fair would not per se be a ground 
upon which a court can set aside a hearing for apparent bias in the absence of its 
being reasonably entertained by the applicants and attributed to the adjudicator.
6 
Similarly, a general perception without particularity held by a group that professional 
judges are inherently prejudiced against a class of litigants may not suffice.
7 Proof of 
apprehension of bias is made easier if it can be shown that the adjudicator has come 
to  adjudication  with  a  baggage  of  known  or  ascertainable  relationships  such  as 
kinship or association (friendly or hostile) in professional, business or other pursuits 
                                                 
3   President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 1999 4 SA 147 
(CC)  para  35  (SARFU  2);  Newfoundland  Telephone  Co  v  Newfoundland  (Board  of 
Commissioners of Public Utilities) 1992 1 SCR 623 636; R v Bow Street Magistrate; Ex parte 
Pinochet [No 2] 2000 1 AC 119 (Pinochet [No 2]) 138 (Pinochet [No 2]). 
4   Stevens 1999 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 379. 
5   The  composition  of  the  tribunal  is  one  sure  visible  manifestation.  Where,  therefore,  certain 
members of a domestic disciplinary tribunal of a political party who sat to hear allegations of 
misconduct against a co-member subsequently participated in the panel that heard the member's 
appeal  upon  their  decision  to  expel  him,  the  Transkei  Division  of  the  High  Court  could  not 
imagine a clearer breach of the rule against bias – Mafongosi v United Democratic Movement 
2002 5 SA 567 (Tk). 
6   In Derby-Lewis v Chairman, Amnesty Committee of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
2001 3 SA 1033 (C) 1067C-D it was argued that in the light of statements made by various 
persons and groups before the amnesty hearing for the murder of Chris Hani, there was a public 
perception that their hearing was not a fair hearing. Although the applicants did not allege bias or 
prejudice on the Committee members, they asked the court to replace the Committee's finding 
with theirs rather than remitting the matter back to the Committee. It was held that "a public 
perception  would  not  be  a  good  ground  for  substituting  our  own  verdict,  if  a  remittal  was 
otherwise indicated. The applicants would at least have to show that they reasonably perceive 
bias on the part of the Amnesty Committee to which their applications are remitted…. They have 
already  accepted  that  at  least  one  Amnesty  Committee  (being  the  Committee  a  quo)  was 
unbiased towards them. On that premise, they must accept that there may be other unbiased 
Committees."  Such  reasonable  perception  was  legitimately  entertained  in  Bam-Mugwanya  v 
Minister of Finance and Provincial Expenditure, Eastern Cape 2001 4 SA 120 (Ck) paras 34-35 
where a member of the Provincial Tender Board misrepresented to the Board that she had no 
interests in the transport services subject of the tender whereas the member and her brother had 
direct interest in the passenger transport industry. It was held that it was a clear-cut instance of a 
situation where she ought to have recused herself from the tender process in its entirety. And 
having not done so, her participation in the tender process tainted the entire exercise with bias. 
7   CUPE v Ontario (Minister of Labour) 2003 226 DLR (4th) 193 paras 199-204 per Binnie J. C OKPALUBA AND L JUMA                                                   PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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with one of the parties in court.
8 It may be that the adjudicator has pecuniary interest 
in the subject matter of dispute;
9 or that she has uttered wo rds or in some other 
manner exhibited  an  obviously  prejudicial attitude  that may  alert  a  party thereby 
prejudiced of the danger that he might not obtain even -handed justice from the 
judge.
10 In the absence of any of these conceivable factors, bias or impartiality falls 
to  be  determined  from  the  circumstances  of  the  case.  Incidentally,  such  a 
determination cannot be founded on an adjudicator's error of interpretation, or on her 
application of the law to the facts before court.
11 The bare fact that a judge has ruled 
against an applicant is not evidence sufficient to show the state of the judge 's mind. 
It alone cannot support a claim of bias nor can it serve as evidence to impeach the 
legal quality of an otherwise well conducted judicial proceeding.
12 Similarly, that a 
deadly legal point was forcefully made by the court during argument in a matter 
cannot give rise to an apprehension of bias in the eyes of the  "reasonable, objective 
and informed litigant in possession of the correct facts."
13 
 
This article attempts to isolate the emerging approaches to the determination of 
actual or apparent bias in South Africa by analysing the jurisprudence on the subject. 
Its purpose is to indicate, albeit  within the confines of available jurisprudence , the 
key factors that may influence the courts in their determination of whether or not 
adjudicative bias has occurred. Notably, therefore, the recent case of  De Lacy and 
Another v South African Post Office
14 dictates the tone of this article, not so much 
because it has laid down principles unknown to this field of the law but for the novelty 
of the allegations and the manner in which they were delivered. The facts of De Lacy 
represent an excellent illustration of what an Australian Chief Justice once described 
as  "fanciful  and  extravagant  assertions  and  demands"  in  the  pretext  that  justice 
                                                 
8   In Webb v The Queen 1994 181 CLR 41 74, which involved the disqualification of a juror, Dean J 
identified  four  distinct,  though  overlapping  categories  of  cases  involving  disqualification  by 
reason of the appearance of bias: interest, conduct, association and extraneous information. 
9   Instances of the disqualifying factors can be gleaned from: Wade and Forsyth Administrative Law 
389-392;  Okpaluba  Right  to  a  Fair  Hearing  185-204;  Devenish,  Govender  and  Hulme 
Administrative  Law  and  Justice  321-333;  Burns  and  Beukes  Administrative  Law  305-307; 
Hoexter, Administrative Law 407-412; Devenish 2000 TSAR 399-408. 
10   Cf Stainbank v South African Apartheid Museum at Freedom Park 2011 ZACC 20 (9 June 2011) 
(Stainbank). 
11   Commissioner, Competition Commission v General Council of the Bar of South Africa 2002 6 SA 
606 (SCA) para 16. 
12   Cf Taku River Tlingit First Nation v Ringstad 2002 211 DLR 89 (BCCA). 
13   Take and Save Trading CC v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2004 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 17 per Harms 
JA. 
14   De Lacy v South African Post Office 2011 ZACC 17 (24 May 2011) (De Lacy). C OKPALUBA AND L JUMA                                                   PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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should  not  only  be  done  but  be  seen  to  be  done.
15  Further,  De  Lacy  has 
necessitated  an  analysis  of  those  adjudicative  guidelines  articulated  recently  in 
Bernert  v  ABSA  Bank  Ltd
16  and  other  Commonwealth  cases  which  invariably 
constitute obstacles in the way of applicants who dare come to court with outlandish 
claims of judicial partiality. It is one case that shows how difficult it is to prove an 
allegation of actual or perceived bias against a judge having regard to the objective 
standards of the fair-minded and informed observer, the presumption of impartiality, 
and the test for establishing bias. 
 
Interestingly, De Lacy did not involve any of the common grounds upon which issues 
of bias often arise.
17 The charges of bias were directed not only towards a single 
judge but towards the whole bench. It was not about their conduct of the proceedings 
but  about  their  judgment.  Incidentally,  the  claim  of  bias  was  made  not  in  the 
complainants' original applications for leave but long after they  had tried their luck 
elsewhere and failed. They (the complainants) neither claimed that the judges or any 
of them had pecuniary interest in a party in court, which was the principal objection in 
Bernert and the only issue before the Supreme Court of Appeal in Ndimeni v Meeg 
Bank Ltd (Bank of Transkei),
18 nor did they allege that the judges, or any of them, 
had any other disqualifying interest or relationship,  prior or on-going, with one or 
other party to the proceeding, or were directly or even remotely connected with the 
case in court. There was also no question of the improper composition of the court. 
The only similarity between De Lacy and S v Basson 2
19 lay in the extent to which 
the former involved alleged incorrect factual findings made by the court, something 
resembling  one  of  the  many  issues  of  apprehended  bias  contested  in  the  latter. 
Again, De Lacy has some link with Bernert insofar as the appellate court's factual 
findings  were  impeached  in  both  cases.  Nonetheless,  neither  the  appellant  in 
Basson 2 nor the applicant in Bernert based their apprehension of bias on inferences 
from the judgments of the trial court or the appeal court, respectively. 
 
  
                                                 
15   Per Barwick CJ, Stollery v Greyhound Racing Control Board 1972 128 CLR 509 518-519. 
16   Bernert v ABSA Bank Ltd 2011 3 SA 92 (CC) (Bernert). 
17   See eg SARFU 2; SACCAWU v Irvin and Johnson Ltd 2000 3 SA 705 (CC) (SACCAWU). 
18   Ndimeni v Meeg Bank Ltd (Bank of Transkei) 2011 1 SA 560 (SCA). 
19   S v Basson 2005 12 BCLR 1192 (CC) (Basson 2) para 30. C OKPALUBA AND L JUMA                                                   PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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2  The bias allegations in De Lacy 
 
What makes De Lacy strikingly different from Basson 2 and Bernert is the wild nature 
of the allegations and the vehemence in the language of attack against the conduct 
of the judges of the Supreme Court of Appeal not during the proceedings but in their 
judgment. If the basis upon which apprehension of bias was made in SARFU 2
20 was 
somewhat odd, then the allegations in De Lacy were not only bizarre - they were 
outrageous. Otherwise, how does a party who approaches the Constitutional Court 
on  leave  to  appeal against  the  judgment  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Appeal prove 
actual bias  on  the  part  of  the  entire  bench  based  on  judgment delivered  by  that 
court?  How  can  the  answer  be  ascertained  from  the  allegation  that  the  court's 
judgment was not delivered impartially and without favour or prejudice? How could 
the  appellants  prove  that  the  Justice  of  Appeal  who  had  no  financial  or  other 
relationship with any of the parties involved in the case  deliberately distorted the 
facts of the case before him "for reasons best known" to him? Or that, at the instance 
of the same presiding judge, the court "decided to find against the applicants and in 
order to give effect to such decision, elected either to disregard the record for such 
purpose,  or  to  apply  interpretations  to  the  record  that  are  inconsistent  with  any 
reasonable understanding of the record."
21 
 
Further allegations of premeditated bias against the Supreme Court of Appeal and 
the presiding judge were that they failed to distinguish between  "facts and own 
interpretations thereof for the purpose of arriving at predetermined findings," and that 
they  "disregarded"  or  "nullified"  admitted facts to support predetermined findings. 
Moreover, the court "wilfully" ignored the evidence in a manner inconsistent with the 
record  and  proceeded  to  make  at  least  114  "grossly  incorrect  findings "  in  "a 
deliberate attempt" to justify the award of the tender to the opponent. Finally, counsel 
submitted that the applicants' complaint was not related to "findings of fact" but to the 
delivery  of  a   judgment  so  lacking  in   impartially  "that  the  integrity,  probit y  and 
impartiality  required  of the  judicial function  were  not  displayed when  the  Court 
decided the appeal."
22 
                                                 
20   SARFU 2. 
21   De Lacy para 5. 
22   De Lacy para 7. C OKPALUBA AND L JUMA                                                   PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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All of these invectives arose because the Supreme Court of Appeal had set aside an 
award  of  R60m  made  to  the  complainants  by  way  of  delictual  damages  by 
Hartzenberg J, who had found that there was fraud in the tender process. Adopting a 
different  approach  to  the  assessment  of  the  facts,  the  appellate  court  found  no 
fraudulent  dealings  in  the  award  of  tenders  in  which  the  applicants  lost.
23  As a 
consequence, it held that the case did not fit into the principles of delictual liability 
laid down in  Minister of Finance and Others v Gore NO
24 and Steenkamp NO  v 
Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape.
25 Incidentally, the allegations of bias did not 
appear in two previous applications for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court 
made by the applicants, although they were the ground of their misconduct complaint 
against Nugent JA to the Judicial Service Commission. As the Deputy Chief Justice 
observed, apart from "the new label of actual or perceived bias, the direct access 
application too amounts to no more than a raging discontent over the factual findings 
of the Supreme Court of Appeal. Although the complaint is clothed in the apparel of 
actual  or  perceived  bias,  it  rests  on  the  same  scathing  attack  of  the  Court's 
findings."
26 The attitude of the appellant was understandable since the Constitutional 
Court  deals  only  with  constitutional  matters  which  ha ve  been  held  to  include 
allegations of judicial  bias.
27 But it does not entertain applications based purely on 
the dispute of facts with a lower court.
28 
  
                                                 
23   South African Post Office v De Lacy and Another 2009 5 SA 255 (SCA). 
24   Minister of Finance v Gore 2007 1 SA 111 (SCA). See the discussion in Okpaluba 2010 Lesotho 
Law Journal 1. 
25   Steenkamp  v  Provincial  Tender  Board,  Eastern  Cape  2007  3  SA  121  (CC);  Steenkamp  v 
Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2006 3 SA 151 (SCA). See the discussion in Okpaluba 
and Osode Government Liability 133-160. 
26   De Lacy para 57. 
27   The  Constitutional  Court  has,  in  two  recent  cases,  reiterated  the  constitutional  basis  of  its 
jurisdiction. In Stainbank paras 27 and 28, Khampepe J held that it is axiomatic that the question 
of whether or not a judicial officer should recuse himself or herself is a constitutional matter, as is 
the question of whether there was actual or reasonable apprehension of bias. It was held that the 
question  of  whether  or  not  the  judge  should  have  recused  himself  and  whether  or  not  the 
applicant had a reasonable apprehension of bias therefore raises a constitutional matter. So too 
does the question of whether or not the High Court in this case was competent  to make the 
impugned  costs  order.  Again,  in  De  Lacy  para  47,  Moseneke  DCJ  adverted  to  some  of  the 
reasons  for  this  when  he  said:  "Judicial  authority  is  an  integral  and  indispensible  cog  of  our 
constitutional architecture. Our supreme law vests judicial authority in the courts - see s 165(1), 
1996 Constitution. It commands that courts must function without fear, favour or prejudice, and 
subject only to the Constitution and the law. It follows that, at all times, the judicial function must 
be exercised in accordance with the Constitution. At a bare minimum this means that courts must 
act not only independently but also without bias, with unremitting fidelity to the law, and must be 
seen to be doing so." See further Bernert para 18; S v Basson 2005 1 SA 171 (CC) (Basson 1) 
paras 21-22; Basson 2 paras 24-5. 
28   See eg S v Marais 2011 1 SA 502 (CC); S v Boesak 2001 1 SA 912 (CC). C OKPALUBA AND L JUMA                                                   PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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3  Actual or apparent bias 
 
Whether the allegation relates to actual or apprehended bias, it is a serious matter 
which strikes at the validity and acceptability of the trial and its outcome. It is for this 
reason  that  once  raised  it  must  be  dealt  with  first  and  foremost.  The  effect  of a 
successful claim of bias results in a retrial of the matter.
29 Actual bias is not often 
found in decided cases and therefore FS v JJ and Another
30 should be considered 
an exception rather than the rule.
31 However, it has been applied in the following two 
fact-situations: (a) where a judge has been influenced by partiality or prejudice in 
reaching a decision; and (b) where it has been demonstrated that a judge is actually 
prejudiced in favour or against a party.
32 In the case of actual bias the disqualifying 
factor exists in fact ,  whereas in the case of apparent bias it does not. What is 
important in apparent bias is that the circumstances surrounding the adjudication are 
such that an inference can be drawn that the judge might be disposed towards one 
side or another in the matter in court. Case law shows that it is difficult to prove 
actual bias,
33 apparently because of the subjectivity attendant upon it. That is why it 
is often unnecessary to investigate whether  or not  there was evidence to suggest 
that there was actual bias .
34 It is enough that apparent bias be shown, that is, if 
                                                 
29   Per Kirby and Crennan JJ, Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design and Development Pty Ltd 2006 
231 ALR 663 para 117. 
30   FS v JJ 2011 3 SA 126 (SCA) paras 41, 43 and 45. The appeal before the Supreme Court of 
Appeal was against a series of orders made by Kgomo JP in the Northern Cape High Court 
whereby he awarded custody to the respondents, the maternal grandmother of the child and her 
husband, an order which was at odds with those made by another Northern Cape Judge and the 
Western Cape High Court. In an application for leave to appeal against his findings, the trial 
judge expressed displeasure at the forum-shopping conduct of the applicants which, in his view, 
was  done  with  the  motive  of  avoiding  the  consequences  of  his  orders.  The  Judge  also 
admonished the applicants' lawyer and accused her of being mischevious. "Ms Deysel's attitude 
and conduct" he said, "is testimony to her utter ignorance of the Rules of Court and her abject 
discourtesy  to  this  court  by  agitating  non-appearance."  The  trial  judge  then  invited  the 
respondents  to  bring  contempt  proceedings  against  the  applicants  if  his  orders  were  not 
complied with. It is these utterances that the Supreme Court of Appeal found to evince bias on 
the part of the trial judge. According to Lewis J, the language used was completely intemperate 
and was to be deplored. Further, by inviting a party to bring contempt proceedings against the 
other, the trial judge had "stepped into the arena" and was more concerned with "legal niceties" 
than with the "child's best interest". 
31   See also McGuirk v University of New South Wales 2010 NSWADTAP 66 paras 9 and 11; PCL 
Constructors Canada Inc v IABSORIW Local No 97 2008 CanLII 39763 (BCLRB) para 1. 
32   In re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No 2) 2001 1 WLR 700 (CA) 711 para 38; 
Davidson v Scottish Ministers 2004 UKHL 34 para 6. 
33   On the contrary, Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 303-304 think it is the other way round. 
For them, it is generally "a simple matter to identify actual bias since the administrator will reflect 
a closed mind to the issues raised." In their view, "a reasonable suspicion of bias or perceived 
bias is rather more complex". 
34   Per Cory J, Newfoundland Telephone 297; Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd 2000 QB C OKPALUBA AND L JUMA                                                   PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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viewed by the objective standard, which is that a reasonably informed person with 
knowledge of the facts would reasonably apprehend the possibility of bias in the 
circumstances.
35 
 
Most  often,  the  parties  start  their  pleading  by  discountenancing  actual  bias   - 
declaring that the integrity of the judge was not in doubt - so they base their case on 
the  apprehension  of  bias.
36  For  instance,  in  McGonnell  v  UK
37  there  was  no 
suggestion that the Bailiff against whom an allegation of reasonable apprehension of 
bias was upheld was subjectively prejudiced or biased when he heard the applicant's 
planning appeal. Moreover, it was not alleged that his participation as Deputy Bailiff 
in  the adoption of  the  development plan  gave  rise  to  actual bias  on  his part.  Of 
course, where actual bias is shown to be present, the judge is disqualified and the 
proceeding is vitiated. Whether bias is actual or perceived is discernible from the 
facts of the case, the conduct, the utterances or the general disposition of the judge 
before or during the proceedings, his/her relationship with one or other of the parties 
or his/her interest in the outcome of the case before the court and the circumstances 
surrounding the entire case.
38 
 
The jurisprudence that has developed out of the principle of impartiality or the rule 
against bias is such that the courts do not insist on  the proof of actual bias on the 
part of the judge, since the appearance or a reasonable apprehension of bias, if 
                                                                                                                                                        
451 472 (Locabail). 
35   Per Lord Brown, R (Al-Hasan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 2005 19 BHRC 282 
(HL) 287 para 37; Granpré J, Committee for Justice and Liberty v National Energy Board 1978 1 
SCR 369 (SCC) 393. Vakuata v Kelly 1989 167 CLR 568 (HCA) is another example. The trial 
judge  had  made  statements  critical  of  the  evidence  given  by  defendant's  medical  experts  in 
previous cases. The Australian High Court held that although no case of actual bias was made 
out against the judge, the remarks made by him would have excited in the minds of the parties 
and  in  members  of  the  public  a  reasonable  apprehension  that  the  judge  might  not  bring  an 
unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the matter before him. 
36   In Davidson v Scottish Ministers 2004 UKHL 34 paras 5 and 7, the appellant was at pains to 
disclaim any challenge to the personal honour or judicial integrity of Lord Hardie. He lodged an 
attack on the interlocutors made by the Scottish Extra Division for apparent bias and want of 
objective impartiality on the ground of Lord Hardie's participation in the making of the orders as 
he  was  the  Lord  Advocate  who  not  only  supported  but  also  made  a  speech  promoting  the 
amendment  to  the  Crown  Proceedings  Act  1947  which  prohibited  the  award  of  injunctive 
remedies against Scottish Ministers. 
37   McGonnell v UK 2000 8 BHRC 56. 
38   On  interests,  relationships  and  associations  capable  of  disqualifying  a  judge  from  sitting  and 
hearing a case as a result of apprehension of partiality see e.g. Dimes v Grand Junction Canal 
Co 1852 3 HL Cas 759; Liebenberg v Brakpan Liquor Licensing Board 1944 WLD 52; Rose v 
Johannesburg Local Road Transportation Board 1947 4 SA 272 (W); Turner v Jockey Club of SA 
1974 3 SA 644 (A); S v Bam 1972 4 SA 41 (E); Barnard v Jockey Club of SA 1984 2 SA 35 (W). C OKPALUBA AND L JUMA                                                   PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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proved, is enough to vitiate the proceedings.
 39 As Lord Nolan said in Pinochet [No2], 
"where the impartiality of a judge is in question the appearance of the matter is just 
as important as the reality."
40 Thus, "it is no answer for the judge to say that he is in 
fact  impartial, that he abided by his judicial oath and there was a fair trial. The 
administration of justice must be preserved from any suspicion that a judge lacks 
independence or that he is impartial. If there are grounds sufficient to create in the 
mind of  the reasonable man a doubt about the judge 's impartiality, the inevitable 
result is that the judge is disqualified from taking any further part in the case. No 
further investigation is necessary, and any decisions he may have made cannot 
stand."
41 
 
But  as  a lready  noted,  actual  bias  is  a  rare  occurrence.  Parties  seeking 
disqualification will therefore rely invariably on the apprehension of bias, and may, in 
fact, acknowledge from the outset the non-existence of actual bias. It is in this regard 
that  the  Supreme  Court of Canada  has  identified three distinct implications of a 
party's saying to the court that she  is not alleging actual bias.
42 First, actual bias 
need not be established because  the  reasonable apprehension of bias can be 
viewed as a surrogate for it. Secondly, the party might be conceding that the judge 
acted  in  good  faith  and  was  hence  not  consciously  relying  on  inappropriate 
perceptions, but was nevertheless unconsciously biased. For, as Lord Goff stated in 
R v Gough,
43 bias "is or may be an unconscious thing and a man may say that he 
was not actually biased and did not allow his interest to affect his mind, although, 
nevertheless, he may have allowed it unconsciously to do so. The matter must be 
determined upon the probabilities to be inferred from the circumstances in which the 
                                                 
39   Per Lord Denning MR, Metropolitan Properties Co (FGC) Ltd v Lannon 1969 1 QB 577 599 "the 
court will not inquire whether [the judges] did, in fact, favour one side unfairly". Neither will they 
"shrink from that task if necessary" although it will hardly be necessary where the allegation is 
reasonable apprehension - EH Cochrane Ltd v Ministry of Transport 1987 1 NZLR 146 (CA) 153 
per Cooke P. 
40   Pinochet [No 2] 1999 1 All ER 577 592h. Along this line of reasoning, O'Linn J of the High Court 
of Namibia had to recuse himself from the trial in S v Dawid 1991 1 SACR 375 (Nm) even though 
he found no atom of truth in the allegation that there had been actual bias on his part against the 
accused arising from his adverse finding on the credibility of the accused as a witness in another 
case.  However,  since  he  could  not  convince  himself  that  the  accused  would  not  harbour  a 
reasonable fear that owing to his earlier finding, he would not be biased in favour of finding that 
the  accused's  evidence  in  this  case  would  also  be  rejected  by  him,  O'Linn  J  granted  the 
application and recused himself from hearing the case. 
41   Per Lord Hope, Millar v Dickson 2002 1 LRC 457 (PC) para 64. 
42   Wewaykum paras 63-66. 
43   R v Gough 1993 AC 646 (HL) 665. See also The Queen v Barnsley JJ 1960 2 QB 167 (CA). C OKPALUBA AND L JUMA                                                   PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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justices sit." Thirdly, the presence or absence of actual bias may not be relevant to 
the  inquiry  since  the  longstanding  aphorism  is  that  "it  is  not  merely  of  some 
importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, 
but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done."
44 The Supreme Court 
then concluded: 
 
Of the three justifications for the objective standard of reasonable apprehension of 
bias,  the  last  is  the  most  demanding  for  the  judicial  system,  because  it 
countenances the possibility that justice might not be seen to be done, even where 
it is undoubtedly done – that is, it envisions the possibility that a decision-maker 
may be totally impartial in circumstances which nevertheless create a reasonable 
apprehension  of  bias,  requiring  his  or  her  disqualification.  But,  even  where  the 
principle is understood in these terms, the criterion of disqualification still goes to 
the  judge's  state  of  mind,  albeit  viewed  from  the  objective  perspective  of  the 
reasonable  person.  The  reasonable  person  is  asked  to  imagine  the  decision-
maker's state of mind, under the circumstances.
45 
 
4  Presumption of impartiality 
 
The  courts  approach  the  constitutional  challenge  of  legislation  by  way  of  an 
interpretative restraint based on a presumption that the law made by the elected 
representatives  of  the  people  is  constitutional  until  the  particulars  of  the 
unconstitutionality are shown. In the same manner, they approach an allegation of 
apprehension  of  bias  against  superior  court  judges  with  the  presumption  of 
impartiality. This is the first hurdle to surmount in an attempt to show that a judge 
had conducted the proceeding in a way that raises an apprehension of bias. The 
courts take the view that given the nature of the judicial office and the oath of office 
of superior court judges, there is no presumption that such a highly dignified public 
functionary would discharge his/her important judicial office with favour, prejudice or 
partiality. On the other hand, the rationale for the presumption is founded on: (a) 
public confidence
46 in the common law system, which is rooted in the fundamental 
                                                 
44   Per Lord Hewart CJ, R v Sussex JJ ex parte McCarthy 1924 1 KB 256 259. 
45   Wewaykum para 67. 
46   That the courts jealously guard over anything that might impinge upon public confidence in the 
administration of justice is illustrated by the  English Court of Appeal decision in  Stansbury v 
Datapulse 2004 IRLR 466 (CA) para 33. Gibson LJ (Latham LJ and Nourse J concurring) held 
that a hearing before an Employment Tribunal might be unfair where a lay member hearing the 
matter was unable to give the hearing his full attention through the consumption of alcohol or 
falling asleep. Further, that a hearing by a tribunal  which included a member who had been 
drinking alcohol to the extent that he appeared to fall asleep and not to be concentrating on the 
case  did  not  give  the  appearance  of  fair  hearing  to  which  every  party  was  entitled.  Public C OKPALUBA AND L JUMA                                                   PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
 
24 / 261 
 
belief  that  those  who  engage  in  adjudication  must  always  do  so  without  bias  or 
prejudice  and  must  be  perceived  to  do  so;  (b)  impartiality  is  the  fundamental 
qualification of a judge and the core attribute of the judiciary; it is the key to the 
common law judicial process and must be presumed on the part of a judge;
47 (c) in 
view of the training and experience; the fact that they are persons of conscience and 
intellectual discipline; and capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the 
basis of its own circumstances,
48 appellate courts inquiring about apprehension of 
bias grant considerable deference to judges by the presumption of impartiality on the 
part of judges; and (d) this presumption carries "considerable weight"
49 since the law 
"will not suppose possibility of bias in a judge, who is already sworn to administer 
impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends u pon that presumption and 
idea."
50 
 
Restating this ancient rule in R v S (RD),
51 Cory J said: 
 
Courts have rightly recognised that there is a presumption that judges will carry out 
their oath of office…. This is one of the reasons why the threshold for a successful 
allegation of perceived judicial bias is high. However, despite this high threshold, 
the presumption can be displaced with  'cogent evidence'  that demonstrates that 
something the judge has done gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.
52 
                                                                                                                                                        
confidence in the administration of justice would be damaged were the court to take the view that 
such behaviour did not matter whereas the member's conduct was "wholly inappropriate" for any 
member of a tribunal. 
47   See e.g. R v S (RD) 1997 3 SCR 484 para 106; Wewaykum paras 58 and 59. See also Canadian 
Judicial Council Ethical Principles 30. 
48   US v Morgan 313 US 409 (1941) 421. 
49   Per L'Heureux-Dube and McLachlin JJ, R v S (RD) 1997 3 SCR 484 para 32. 
50   Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England III 361.   
51   R v S (RD) 1997 3 SCR 484 para 34. 
52   Such  cogent  evidence  did  not  exist  in  Mugesera  v  Canada  (Minister  of  Citizenship  and 
Immigration 2005 254 DLR (4
th) 193 (SCC) paras 13-16. In an appeal against the order of the 
Federal Court of Appeal setting aside a deportation order against the respondent, it was alleged 
that the Minister, some of his Ministerial colleagues and a strong Jewish lobby had conspired to 
have the respondent and his family deported from Canada. Although Justice Abella, a recent 
appointee to the Supreme Court Bench, had of her own accord voluntarily recused herself from 
sitting  in  the  matter  because  her  husband  was  chair  of  the  War  Crimes  Committee  of  the 
Canadian Jewish Congress, a party to the proceedings, the respondent had alleged that she was 
appointed to the Supreme Court to deliver judgment that will lead to his deportation. There was 
no evidence that any of the judges of the Supreme Court who heard the case had anything to do 
with the case prior to the court proceeding. Thus, no reasonable person would think that after 
recusal Abella J's mere presence as a member of the court would impair the ability of the other 
members to remain impartial. Without an iota of evidence to rebut the presumption of impartiality, 
it was held that it operated against the respondent whose motion was "flagrantly without basis in 
fact or in law." It constituted "an unqualified and abusive attack on the integrity of the Judges of 
this Court." The court further observed: "If there is a duty on the part of one member of our Court 
to  recuse  him  or  herself,  it  is  an  astounding  proposition  to  suggest  that  the  same  duty C OKPALUBA AND L JUMA                                                   PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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The persistence of this presumption in Canadian law was recently reiterated by the 
Supreme Court in these words: "the presumption of impartiality carries considerable 
weight, and the law should not carelessly evoke the possibility of bias in a judge, 
whose authority depends upon that presumption."
53 The effect of this presumption is 
that "while the requirement of judicial impartiality is a stringent one, the burden is on 
the party arguing for disqualification to establish that the circumstances justify a 
finding that the judge must be disqualified."
54 
 
South African courts also apply the presumption that judicial officers are impartial in 
adjudicating disputes.
55 Thus, in adopting the opinion expressed in  R v S (RD) as 
"entirely consistent with the approach of South African courts to applications for the 
recusal  of  a  judicial  officer,"  the  Constitutional  Court  held  in  SARFU  2  that  a 
presumption in favour of judges' impartiality must be taken into account in deciding 
whether  or  not  a  reasonable  litigant  would  have  entertained  a  reasonable 
apprehension  that  the  judicial  officer  was  or  might  be  biased.
56  The  court 
emphasised the effect of the presumption to be that the person alleging must go 
further to prove. It must be recalled that the applicant in this case reque sted that 
about half of the Constitutional Court bench should be recused from sitting in appeal 
on his matter. It would appear, therefore, that the higher in the judicial hierarchy, the 
higher is the burden of proof of the apprehended bias against the judge, especially in 
a multi-judge panel. 
 
In considering the numerous allegations based on  the apprehension of bias in  S v 
Basson 2,
57 the Constitutional Court held that the presumption in favour of the trial 
judge must apply. This means, first, that the court considering a claim of bias must 
take into account the presumption of impartiality. Secondly, in order to establish bias, 
a complainant would have to show that the remarks made by the trial judge were of 
                                                                                                                                                        
automatically attaches to the rest of the Court or compromises the integrity of the whole Court. 
To reach that conclusion would be to ascribe a singular fragility to the impartiality that a judge 
must  necessarily  show,  and  to  the  ability  of  judges  to  discharge  the  duties  associated  with 
impartiality in accordance with the traditions of our jurisprudence". 
53   Wewaykum para 59. 
54   Wewaykum para 59. 
55   Eg S v Radebe 1973 1 SA 796 (A) 813F-G; R v T 1953 2 SA 479 (A) 483C-D. 
56   SARFU 2 para 41. 
57   Basson 2 para 30. C OKPALUBA AND L JUMA                                                   PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
 
26 / 261 
 
such a number and quality as to go beyond any suggestion of mere irritation by the 
judge caused by a long trial. It had to be shown that the trial judge's was a pattern of 
conduct  sufficient  to  "dislodge  the  presumption  of  impartiality  and  replace  it  with 
reasonable  apprehension  of  bias."
58  In  Bernert,  the  court  stressed  that  both  the 
person who apprehends bias and the apprehension itself must be reasonable. Thus, 
the two-fold emphasis serves to underscore the weight of the burden resting on a 
person  alleging  judicial  bias  or  its  appearance.
59  This  double-requirement  of 
reasonableness also "highlights the fact that mere apprehensiveness on the part of a 
litigant that a judge will be biased - even a strongly and honestly felt anxiety - is not 
enough." The court must carefully scrutinise the apprehension to determine if it is, in 
all the circumstances, a reasonable one.
60 
 
 
5  Test for establishing bias 
 
The  current  double  reasonableness  test,  which  commenced  its  journey  in  the 
Supreme Court of Canada
61 and then travelled through the High Court of Australia,
62 
                                                 
58   Basson 2 para 42. See also SACCAWU paras 13 and 14. Thus, in Stainbank para 45, it was held 
that there was no question that the judge was irritated by the conduct of the applicant's attorney 
given his disregard of the rules. But bearing in mind that the applicant was responsible for that, it 
was  understandable  that  he  might  have  formed  a  subjective  impression  that  the  judge  was 
biased  against  him.  Although  Khampepe  J  found  that  this  case  came  close  to  satisfying  the 
reasonable apprehension test, she held that all factors considered, it fell short of dislodging the 
presumption of impartiality. Hence the case of bias failed. 
59   SACCAWU para 15. 
60   Bernert para 34; De Lacy para 70. 
61   In Committee for Justice and Liberty v National Energy Board 1978 68 DLR (3d) 716 735 de 
Granpré J laid down what has become the trademark of public adjudication in modern Canada 
when he stated that: "the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable 
and  right  minded  persons,  applying  themselves  to  the  question  and  obtaining  thereon  the 
required  information.  …  That  test  is  'what  would  an  informed  person,  viewing  the  matter 
realistically and practically – and having thought the matter through – conclude.' Would he think 
that it is more likely than not that [the decision-maker], whether consciously or unconsciously, 
would not decide fairly?" See also Newfoundland Telephone 636; Reference re: Public Sector 
(The Provincial Court Judges case) 1997)150 DLR (4
th) 577 630; R v S (RD) 1997 3 SCR 484 
paras 11, 31 and 111; 1997 118 CCC (3d) 353 369 per McLaughlin J and L'Heureux-Dubé J, per 
Cory J 389-390; R v Valente 1986 24 DLR (4
th) 161 172; Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship 
and Immigration) 1999 174 DLR (4
th) 193 220-221; Therrien v Minister of Justice 2001 200 DLR 
1 55 para 102; Miglin v Miglin 2003 SCC 24 (CanLII) para 26; Wewaykum paras 59-60; R v 
Brown 2003 CanLII 52142 (Ont CA) para 37; Marchand (Litigation Guardian of) v Public General 
Hospital Society of Chatham 2000 CanLII 16946 (ONCA) (leave to appeal to SCC refused 2002 
156  OAC  358);  R  v  Werner  2005  NWTCA  5  (CanLII)  para  11;  R  v  Quinn  2006  BCCA  255 
(CanLII) para 54. 
62   In Livesey v NSW Bar Association 1983 151 CLR 288 293-294, the previous "high probability" 
test  was supplanted by the reasonable  apprehension test,  which  was  laid down by the High C OKPALUBA AND L JUMA                                                   PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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is so called because it translates into a two-stage requirement of reasonableness. It 
is a  refinement  of  sorts  of  the formulation by  the  late  Professor  De  Smith  in  his 
rationalisation of the real likelihood test as "based on the reasonable apprehensions 
of  a  reasonable  man."
63  There must be an apprehension of bias that must be 
reasonably entertained. That is the first stage. In the second stage, the apprehension 
must be one held by a reasonable person, someone who need not have interest in 
the outcome of the matter in court other than the general interest shared by the 
public in the fair administration of justice. The fulfilment of this gener al interest is 
mainly a pre-occupation with a fair administration of justice; a concern that justice is 
not only done but is manifestly and undoubtedly seen to be done. 
 
In order to satisfy the requirement that an apprehension of bias must be reasonable 
in  the circumstances, the reasonable, objective, informed and fair -minded person 
enters the fray.
64 It follows that an application for the disqualification of a judge will 
not  succeed  if  the  applicant  fails  to  demonstrate  that  the  adjudicator  in  the 
circumstances might have departed or was in danger of departing from the standard 
of even-handed justice, or that there appeared the possibility that the judge might 
incline  to  one  side  or  the  other  in  the  dispute.
65  This  requirement  for  anyone 
                                                                                                                                                        
Court  as  follows:  "That  principle  is  that  a  judge  should  not  sit  to  hear  a  case  if  in  all  the 
circumstances the parties or the public might entertain a reasonable apprehension that he might 
not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question involved in it." 
Applied  in  subsequent  High  Court  cases:  Vakauta  v  Kelly  1989  167  CLR  568;  Webb  v  The 
Queen 1994 181 CLR 41; Johnson v Johnson 2000 201 CLR 488; Ebner v Official Trustee in 
Bankruptcy 2000 205 CLR 337; Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte 
Epeabaka 2001 206 CLR 128; Hot Holdings Pty Ltd v Creasy 2002 210 CLR 438. See also 
Australian National Industries Ltd v Spedley Securities Ltd 1992 26 NSWLR 411; Gas and Fuel 
Corporation Superannuation Fund v Saunders 1994 52 FCR 48. In McGovern v Ku-Ring-Gai 
Council 2009 251 ALR 558, the Court of Appeal of New South Wales, dealing with apprehension 
of  bias  on  the  ground  of  prejudgment  in  the  context  of  a  non-judicial  multi-member  elected 
decision-making body not subject to the stringent requirements of a court of law, held that the 
test for apprehension of bias by prejudgment was if an independent observer might reasonably 
apprehend that the decision-maker might not be open to persuasion and  that in this context, 
there  was  no  requirement  that  each  of  the  decision-makers kept  an  "open  mind"  until  every 
decision-maker  was  prepared  to  make  a  decision.  The  trial  judge  had  asked  the  incorrect 
question relating to the test by asking if the decision-maker would, rather than might, not be 
impartial, although he came to the conclusion that would have arisen from asking the correct 
question. 
63   De Smith Judicial Review 230. 
64   Sager v Smith 2001 3 SA 1004 (SCA); S v Roberts 1999 4 SA 915 (SCA). See also the judgment 
of Leon JP in the Swazi Court of Appeal in Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs v Stanley 
Wilfred Sapire; In Re Stanley Wilfred Sapire 2002 (Unreported) Civ Appeal No. 49/2001 (Re 
Sapire). 
65   The applicable test in federal law in the United States is similar to the test under discussion. For 
instance, the United States Supreme Court held in Likety v United States 510 US 540 (1994) 564 
that disqualification is required "if an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions C OKPALUBA AND L JUMA                                                   PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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occupying the judicial office applies equally in England,
66 Lesotho,
67 Swaziland
68 and 
the European Human Rights regime.
69 
 
Like the Australian High Court in Livesey, and the Canadian Supreme Court in R v S 
(RD),  the  Constitutional  Court  of  South  Africa  opted  for  the  "reasonable 
apprehension" test because of "the inappropriate connotations which might flow from 
the use of the word 'suspicion' in this context."
70 As formulated, the test is: "whether 
a reasonable, objective and informed person would on the correct facts reasonably 
apprehend that the judge has not or will not bring an impartial mind to bear on the 
adjudication of the case, that is, a mind open to persuasion by the evidence and 
submissions of counsel."
71 Unfortunately, however, in reading recent judgments of 
                                                                                                                                                        
about the judge's impartiality. If a judge's attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to 
conclude  that  a  fair  and  impartial  hearing  is  unlikely,  the  judge  must  be  disqualified."  See 
generally Flamm Judicial Disqualification. 
66   In England, the journey started with the modifications of the then existing test by the Court of 
Appeal in Re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No 2) 2000 1 WLR 700 para 85; the 
overruling of the "real danger" test by the House of Lords in Potter v Magill 2002 2 AC 357; and 
the unanimous endorsement of the adjusted test in Lawal v Northern Spirit Ltd 2003 IRLR 538 
(HL) para 14 by the House of Lords. See further Meerabux v Attorney General of Belize 2005 2 
AC 513 (PC); Gilles v Secretary of State for Works and Pensions 2006 UKHL 2; R v Abdroikov 
2008 1 All ER 315 (HL); AWG Group Ltd v Morrison 2006 EWCA Civ 6; R v Khan 2008 3 All ER 
502 (CA). 
67   Sole v Cullinan 2003 8 BCLR 935 (Les CA); Sekoati v President of the Court Martial 2001 7 
BCLR 750 (LAC). 
68   Re Sapire; Law Society of Swaziland v Swaziland Government Civil Case No. 743/2003 (17 April 
2003); Lawyers for Human Rights v Attorney General of Swaziland 2001 (Unreported) Appeal 
Case No. 34/2001; Dumisa Mbusi Dlamini v Swaziland Electricity Board Appeals Nos. 15 and 18 
of 1999. 
69   In  Findlay  v  United  Kingdom  1997  24  EHRR  221  para  73,  it  was  stated  that:  "[i]n  order  to 
establish whether a tribunal can be considered as 'independent', regard must be had inter alia to 
the manner of appointment of its members and their term of office, the existence of guarantees 
against  outside  pressures  and  the  question  whether  the  body  presents  an  appearance  of 
independence. As to the question of 'impartiality', there are two aspects to this requirement. First, 
the tribunal must be subjectively free of personal prejudice or bias. Secondly, it must also be 
impartial from an objective viewpoint, that is, it must offer sufficient guarantees to exclude any 
legitimate doubt in this respect." Affirming this approach in McGonnell v UK 2000 8 BHRC 56 
para 57, the European Court of Human Rights held that the issue was whether the Bailiff of 
Guernsey had the required "appearance of independence" or the required "objective impartiality" 
in circumstances where the Bailiff functions in judicial as  well as non-judicial  capacities. The 
Bailiff  while  acting  as  Deputy  Bailiff  in  the  present  matter  had  presided  over  the  Legislative 
Assembly deliberations over the plaintiff's planning application. Subsequently, he presided over 
the applicant's planning appeal to the Royal Court. The court held that these circumstances were 
capable of casting doubt on his impartiality when he subsequently determined, as the sole judge 
of the law in the applicant's appeal. The applicant was therefore entitled to the legitimate view 
that the Bailiff might have been influenced by his prior participation in the Assembly's decision on 
the planning application. "That doubt in itself, however slight its justification, is sufficient to vitiate 
the impartiality of the Royal Court, and it is therefore unnecessary for the court to look into other 
aspects of the complaint." 
70   SARFU 2 para 38. 
71   SARFU 2 para 48; SACCAWU paras 11-17. C OKPALUBA AND L JUMA                                                   PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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the  Supreme  Court  of  Appeal  of  South  Africa,  one  discerns  a  jumbled  approach 
whereby the jettisoned test of reasonable suspicion is muddled with the current and 
prevailing test.
72 
 
In effect, notwithstanding the fact that the reasonable apprehension test has been 
systematically applied,
73 quite recently,
74 when the Supreme Court of Appeal was 
                                                 
72   Similarly, the Lesotho High Court sitting as a Constitutional Court wittingly or unwittingly deviated 
from the double-reasonableness test earlier endorsed by the Court of Appeal judgment (Sole v 
Cullinan 2003 8 BCLR 935 (Les CA)). The argument in the controversial "Mercedes Benz gift 
case" was that most of the Judges of the High Court including the three sitting to hear the matter 
in  Molapo  v  Ntsekhe  Civ/P/2/2007  (8  August  2007),  an  election  petition,  should  recuse 
themselves  as  they  benefitted  from  the  scheme  whereby  they  were  enabled  to  purchase 
Mercedes Benz cars for paltry amounts. It was alleged that, as beneficiaries of the said scheme, 
the three Judges could not reasonably be perceived as impartial arbiters in a disputed election 
which may have an influence on the balance of power in Parliament. The question before the 
court  was  whether  the  Judges  of  the  High  Court  having  been  listed  in  the  relevant  legal 
instrument  as  beneficiaries  to  the  Imperial  Scheme  thereby  being  able  to  purchase  the  said 
motor vehicles at predetermined prices, there was a real likelihood that the Judges of the panel 
might be inclined to be prejudiced in favour of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy, the ruling 
majority party in the election petition involving the applicants and the respondents. Even after 
referring  to  the  South  African  Supreme  Court  of  Appeal's  emphasis  on  the  double 
reasonableness test as captured in Sole v Cullinan by Gauntlett JA, Peete J still fell back on the 
real  likelihood  test.  At  another  stage,  the  Judge  reverted  to  the  double  reasonableness  test 
relying on BTR Industries South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Metal and Allied Workers Union 1992 3 SA 673 
(A)  690A-695C,  which  was  the  precursor  to  the  current  test  formulated  by  the  Constitutional 
Court  of  South  Africa  in  SARFU  2.  The  difference  in  the  two  approaches  is  that  in  BTR 
Industries, no distinction was drawn between real likelihood, reasonable suspicion or reasonable 
apprehension  of  bias;  all  three  expressions  appeared  to  have  been  used  interchangeably  - 
somewhat akin to the approach of Lord Brown-Wilkinson in Pinochet [No 2] 1999 1 All ER 577 
586b. Finally, Peete J held that although some of the Judges had purchased Mercedes Benz 
vehicles, an act which was not shown to have been illegal or corrupt, this could not have created 
in  the  mind  of  a  reasonable  right-thinking  person  a  reasonable  apprehension  that  the  said 
Judges would likely be biased in favour of the ruling party merely because it was apprehended 
that the Judges had an interest in the outcome of the election petition. No right-thinking Judge 
contrary to his/her solemn Oath of Office would be inclined to bend his or her impartiality in 
favour of any party (including the majority party) merely because Mercedes Benz Kompressor 
cars had been allocated to them for their use and for their ultimate purchase at whatever terms or 
price. 
73   Take and Save Trading CC 2004 4 SA 1 (SCA); Van Rooyen v The State (General Council of the 
Bar of South Africa Intervening) 2002 5 SA 246 (CC); S v Shackell 2001 4 SA 1 (CC); KwaZulu 
Transport (Pty) Ltd v Mnguni 2001 22 ILJ 1646 (LC); Natal Rugby Union v Gould 1999 1 SA 432 
(SCA); Financial Services Board v Pepkor Pension Fund 1999 1 SA 167 (C). 
74   Indeed, Wallis J held in Ndlovu v Minister of Home Affairs 2011 2 SA 621 paras 20, 35 and 38 
that the law with regard to applications for recusal was settled in the trilogy of Constitutional 
Court cases: SARFU 2 paras 35-48; SACCAWU paras 11-17; and Bernert paras 28-37. The 
learned  Judge  proceeded  to  apply  the  double-reasonableness  test  embedded  in  those 
judgments in determining the application for his recusal for apprehension of bias arising from the 
critical views he expressed in a public lecture relating to a system of contingency fees which he 
argued required safeguards to prevent its being exploited by legal practitioners who might see in 
it an opportunity to enrich themselves. The applicant's ground for recusal was that the judge held 
a fixed view - a prejudgment - on the costs order which the applicant sought. It was held that no 
reasonable,  objective  reader  would  conclude,  after  reading  the  judge's  article  and  with 
knowledge that the area of costs was one in which there was enormous body of well-established 
authority setting out principles that bind a judge, that in any case involving contingency fees that C OKPALUBA AND L JUMA                                                   PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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faced  with  the  issue  of  structural  bias  in  Islamic  Unity  Convention  v  Minister  of 
Telecommunications and Others,
75 it appeared to have lumped it together with the 
"reasonable suspicion of bias" of BTR Industries South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others v 
Metal and Allied Workers Union and Another
76 vintage. Again, although the test for 
determining bias or apprehension of it was not in issue in S v Khoza
77 but whether 
the  conduct  of  the  trial  was  riddled  with  procedural  as  well  as  substantive 
irregularities, Mhlantla JA referred to the "suspicion of bias" in considering whether 
or not a trial was vitiated by bias on the part of the judge. In contrast to the foregoing 
is the approach of Mpati P in Ndimeni v Meeg Bank Ltd (Bank of Transkei).
78 The 
court  was  called  upon  to  decide  whether  or  not  an  Acting  Judge  should  have 
recused himself from hearing the labour dispute because "close members of [his] 
family" had some commercial relationship with the respondent. The President held 
that  the  facts  "satisfy  the  requirements  of  the  'reasonable  apprehension  of  bias' 
test."
79  There was no mention of the other cases or indeed of any other test, 
discarded or prevailing. 
 
As already noted, the reasonable  "suspicion of bias" test was discarded in  SARFU 
2
80 because of the inappropriateness of its connotations. Clearly, the approach of the 
Supreme  Court  of  Appeal  could  have  been  rationalised  on  the  basis  that  the 
application came to court by way of the judicial review of administrative action under 
section  6(2)(a)(iii)  of  the  Promotion  of  Administrative  Justice  Act  of  2000.
81  This 
subsection recognises bias or  the reasonable suspicion of bias as a ground of  the 
judicial review of administrative action. But the court made  no attempt to explain 
whether it applied  the test in Islamic Unity Convention because it was reviewing a 
decision on PAJA ground, or if the SARFU 2 test did not apply to the matter. It must 
be admitted that section 6(2)(a)(iii) introduced in its own right elements of confusion 
in  a  subject  where  judges  and  academics  alike  agree  that  it  is  a  matter  of 
                                                                                                                                                        
came before the judge, he would disregard the established principles and make a finding on the 
costs adverse to the party whose lawyers were employed on a contingency-fee basis.  
75   Islamic Unity Convention v Minister of Communications 2008 3 SA 383 (SCA) para 40. 
76   BTR Industries South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Metal and Allied Workers Union 1992 3 SA 673 (A). 
77   S v Khoza 2010 2 SACR 207 (SCA) para 61. 
78   Ndimeni v Meeg Bank Ltd (Bank of Transkei) 2011 1 SA 560 (SCA). 
79   Ndimeni v Meeg Bank Ltd (Bank of Transkei) 2011 1 SA 560 (SCA) para 23. 
80   SARFU 2 para 38. 
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semantics
82 and as Baxter put it, there is  "a welter of unintentional terminological 
vacillation"  in  this  field.
83  But  does  it  follow,  as  Hoexter  suggests,  that  the 
Constitutional Court's preference for the "reasonable apprehension" test is confined 
to "cases relating to the recusal of judges"?
84 Taking a second look at the logic of 
that reasoning, does it then mean that there are two tests: (a) "reasonable suspicion" 
for the application for judicial review under section 6(2)(a)(iii); and (b)  "reasonable 
apprehension" where a recusal application is made?  In the absence of any further 
explanation as to why this should be the case, it would appear that the prevailing test 
in  any  of  the  two  circumstances  postulated  remains  the  acceptable  double 
reasonableness  test  described  in  this  article.  If  an  applicant  alleges  bias  or 
reasonable suspicion of bias in accordance with section 6(2)(a)(iii), that is the cause 
of action and the test in determining  if the allegation is proved is the reasonable 
apprehension of a reasonable person test. 
 
Upon all of these, the Constitutional Court in  Basson 2
85 itself spoke of there being 
two different approaches to the determination of the appearance of bias. The first 
focused  on  whether  or  not  there  was  a  real  likelihood  of  bias,  while  the  second 
concerned the existence or otherwise of a reasonable apprehension of bias. It was 
not necessary for a litigant who complained of bias to establish that there was a real 
likelihood of bias; a real apprehension of bias was sufficient. In this sense, a real 
likelihood of bias assumes the role of actual bias and, if this is so, it falls off as a test 
and  turns  into  a  question  of  fact.  In  these  circumstances,  clarifications  would  be 
desirable  from  the  same  Constitutional  Court,  the  highest  judicial  authority  on 
constitutional jurisdiction in South Africa, as to whether this development is a slip, a 
misconception, or the outcome of a deliberately intention to return to the status quo 
ante. 
 
Now, did the Constitutional Court take the opportunity of addressing the problem in 
Bernert and/or De Lacy?
86 The answer to this question is not c lear-cut. Depending 
on how one looks at the matter, it could be argued that by not referring to the current 
                                                 
82   See e.g. Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 334. 
83   Baxter Administrative Law 558. 
84   Hoexter Administrative Law 407. 
85   Basson 2 para 29. 
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approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal, the Constitutional Court more or less 
turned  a  blind  eye  to  that  development  as  well  as  to  the  confusion  it  created  in 
Basson 2. In both Bernert and De Lacy the court simply proceeded to restate the 
double reasonableness test which has dominated South African adjudication since 
SARFU 2. It could be argued in the alternative that the issue of reformulating the 
appropriate or existing test was not before the court and that its reference to the 
double-reasonableness test was in the normal course of disposing of the questions 
for  determination  in  both  cases.  Remarkably,  the  court  dwelt  extensively  on  the 
double-reasonableness  test  in  Bernert
87  in  dealing  with  the  question:  when  will 
shareholding or other financial interest in a litigant company by a judicial officer give 
rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias? And further, when does ownership of 
shares  by  a  judicial  officer  in  a  litigant  company  give  rise  to  a  reasonable 
apprehension  of  bias?  In his judgment,  Ngcobo  CJ left no one  in  doubt that  the 
answer  lies  in  the  double-reasonableness  test  enunciated  and  applied  in  this 
jurisdiction. With the concurrence of the entire bench he held that: 
 
Inevitably,  a  reasonable,  objective  and  informed  person  would  reasonably 
apprehend that a judicial officer who has a direct financial interest in the outcome of 
proceedings would not bring an impartial mind to bear on the adjudication of the 
case. Although a judicial officer may have a pecuniary interest in the form of shares 
or other financial interest in a company that is a party to the proceedings before him 
or her that does not necessarily mean that the judicial officer has a financial interest 
in the outcome of those proceedings. In many cases in which a company is a party 
to the litigation, the outcome of the proceedings may have no capacity to affect the 
value of the shares held by the judicial officer or his or her ownership of those 
shares. A reasonably informed litigant, therefore, would not reasonably apprehend 
that, simply because a judicial officer owns shares in a litigant company, the judicial 
officer would not bring an impartial mind to bear in adjudicating the case. But at the 
same time, it cannot be assumed that proceedings in which a company is a party 
will not affect the shares held by the judicial officer in that company or his or her 
interest in those shares.
88 
  
Since the foregoing pronouncements were no mere dicta but an essential part of the 
ratio,  one  may  argue  that  it  could  reasonably  be  inferred  that  in  reiterating  and 
reinvigorating  the  double-reasonableness  test  in  Bernert  and  De  Lacy,  the 
Constitutional Court could be said to have set the record straight.
89 
                                                 
87   Bernert paras 45-66. 
88   Bernert para 46. 
89   No mention was made of the problem in the Constitutional Court judgment in Stainbank para 35. 
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6  De Lacy in context 
 
When the facts in this case are assessed with regard to the presumption of judicial 
impartiality  and  the  double  requirement  of  reasonableness,  could  a  fair-minded, 
reasonable observer have reasonably apprehended that the court, or the presiding 
judge, or both were biased in rendering a judgment that reversed the award made by 
the trial judge? Given the nature of the allegations the appellants made against the 
judges who rendered the judgment whereby a whopping R60m evaporated before 
their very eyes, neither the appellants nor their counsel could have been described 
as  being  anything  like  objective  bystanders.  The  court  had  no  doubt  that  the 
prevailing jurisprudence in South Africa is that a judicial officer who sits on a case in 
which there exists a reasonable apprehension that he or she might be biased acts in 
a manner that is inconsistent with the Constitution. The judicial system requires that 
courts must not only be impartial and independent; they must also be seen to be so. 
Thus an apprehension of bias, if reasonable, would entitle an aggrieved litigant to 
have the adverse decision set aside.
90 
 
Bias  claims  are  not  only  "fact-driven;"
91  they are  "highly  fact-specific."
92  A claim 
based on  the adjudicative partiality of a court must therefore be based on facts
93 
                                                 
90   De Lacy para 68; Bernert para 28; SARFU 2 para 35. 
91   Peart v Peel Police 2006 CanLII 37566 (Ont CA) para 40. The recent New Zealand case of Smith 
v Attorney General 2010 NZCA 258 (CA) paras 14, 19 and 22-25 is a good illustration. In it the 
appellant,  a  prisoner,  sought  to  review  his  classification  as  a  maximum  security  prisoner  as 
unlawful due to some alleged breaches of the rules of natural justice but got embroiled in several 
unsubstantiated recusal applications. Before the Court of Appeal, the appellant made a recusal 
application of all three judges or at least some of them, relying first on the fact that the panel was 
not chosen by lot, a system not normally used in that court. The court dismissed this argument 
since a lottery was not what was required by law.
 The second was that the wife of one of the 
Judges was a member of the parole board. This matter was brought to the attention of the panel 
prior to the hearing by the judge in question. She had participated in a relatively recent review of 
the appellant's case but had nothing to do with the reviews before court, the events of which 
happened a long time previously. The panel discussed the matter collectively and took the view 
that  the  matter  should  be  drawn  to  the  attention  of  counsel,  who  confirmed  that  he  had  no 
concerns. The appellant now argued that the panel should not have met to discuss the issue 
prior  to  the  hearing.  This  argument,  like  the  first,  overlooked  the  practice  in  judicial  quarters 
where, in principle, discussion between judges is a good thing from the beginning to the end of a 
case. See also Australian Institute of Judicial Administration Guide to Judicial Conduct 15-16; 
Paterson Law Lords 91. The third ground of recusal was that Arnold J was Solicitor General 
when the appellant's appeal was dealt with in 2003. Here, again, there was no evidence that 
Arnold J had had any involvement in that appeal. Finally, it was contended that the panel was not 
independent  because  of  some  entitlement  matters.  It  was  alleged  that  when  Arnold  J  was 
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substantial  enough  to  satisfy  the  requirements  of  the  fair-minded  reasonable 
observer. In De Lacy the applicants alleged only that the Supreme Court of Appeal 
committed 114 factual errors which were not borne out by the record. They based 
their  case  on  the  formulations  in  Basson  and  Bernert,  where  it  was  held  that  a 
mistake on the facts will give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias only if it was 
so unreasonable on the record that it was inexplicable except on the basis of bias. 
The court held in both cases that a mistake on the facts, even if it were so shown, 
would not ordinarily be sufficient on its own to justify a reasonable apprehension of 
bias. A litigant who relies on bias based on incorrect factual findings indeed carries 
the  onus  of  establishing  the  partiality,  and  this,  indeed,  is  a  formidable  onus  to 
discharge. For that to happen, an applicant must, in the first instance, show that the 
factual  findings  were  erroneous  on  the  appeal  record.  This  is  a  threshold 
requirement. If it is not met "the question of unreasonableness will not arise, and the 
litigant fails at the first hurdle."
94 However, if a mistake on the facts is shown it will 
justify a reasonable apprehension of bias only if the error relates to a material fact 
and it is so unreasonable that it is inexplicable except on the grounds of bias.
95 
 
Delivering a judgment unanimously endorsed by all members of the Constitutional 
Court, Moseneke DCJ emphasised three important requirements where an applicant 
relies on a reasonable apprehension of bias based on incorrect factual findings. 
They must show that:  "the impugned findings are not supported by the record; the 
findings are not mere misdirections but are errors that are so unreasonable that they 
are inexplicable except on the basis of a reasonable apprehension of bias; and,  the 
factual findings complained of are material to the outcome of the underlying claim. It 
is self-evident that if an error complained of is immaterial or unrelated to the outcome 
of the case, then it can hardly be said to induce a reasonable apprehension of 
bias".
96 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
and post-1992 judges. The bearing this might have had on the judicial independence of the court 
was unclear. Hence it was, like the other allegations, dismissed by the Court of Appeal. 
92   Wewaykum paras 76-78; Lesiczka v Sahota 2007 BCSC 479 (CanLII) para 13. 
93   Christian t/a Hope Financial Services v Chairman, Financial Services Board (1) 2009 1 NLR 22 
(HCNm). 
94   Bernert paras 102-103; Basson 2 para 70. 
95   De Lacy paras 71-72. 
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It was held, nonetheless, that the Supreme Court of Appeal committed no factual 
error. It was obvious that in the absence of direct evidence of dishonesty and corrupt 
manipulation  the  two  courts  drew  entirely  different  inferences.
97  Thus,  having 
examined the big ticket items the applicants put up as ex amples of findings that 
diverge from the record, it was overwhelmingly clear that the applicants failed to 
show that the judgment complained of contained any material irregularity reasonably 
capable of inducing a reasonable apprehension of bias. There was  also nothing in 
the  findings  of  that  court  that  could  ever  justify  the  "baseless  and  scurrilous 
accusations of a deliberate distortion of facts and actual bias on the part of the panel 
of five judges of an appellate court."
 98 Accordingly, the bias claim had no prospects 
of success whatsoever. 
 
The foregoing discussion would have brought home at least three hard facts which 
applicants  for  the  apprehension  of  bias  often  lose  sight  of.  The  first  is  the 
admonitions of Mason J whereby he made it clearly" that the fact that the ground of 
disqualification is a reasonable apprehension that the judicial officer will not decide 
the case impartially or without prejudice does not mean that he will decide the case 
adversely to one party.
99 The second is the statement th at allegations are easier 
made than proved applies more appropriately to the present case than in any other. 
The third is that in a case such as De Lacy, there is an element of truth to the saying 
that a "charge of actual bias is tantamount to a plea of fraud."
100 Not only is cogent 
evidence  required  to  prove  its  existence ,  but  it  must  be  "clearly  pleaded  and 
particularised" in court proceedings.
101 This means that the burden of proof of actual 
bias,  especially where it is alleged to have been deliberate ,  is as  heavy as  the 
burden of proof of fraud, bad faith or misfeasance in public office. The appellants in 
De  Lacy  merely  alleged  but  could  not  prove  any  of  their  allegations  against  the 
Supreme Court of Appeal or the presiding Judge. De Lacy clearly falls within the 
category of cases described by Wade and Forsyth as "fanciful allegations of bias."
102  
 
                                                 
97   De Lacy para 83. 
98   De Lacy para 113. 
99   Re JRL; Ex parte CJL 1986 161 CLR 342 352. See also per Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ, 
Re Polites; Ex parte Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd 1991 173 CLR 78 86; Locabail 480. 
100  Forbes Justice in Tribunals para 15.7. 
101  Forbes Justice in Tribunals para 15.7. 
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7  Conclusion 
 
The cases discussed in this article are diverse in their approach to the subject of bias 
but, as the analysis has shown, they indicate some pattern of settled principles which 
complainants must contend with in order to convince a court of the genuineness of 
their allegations. The first of those principles is the presumption of impartiality, which 
often  works  in  favour  of  the  court.  Failure  to  rebut  this  presumption  makes  the 
complainant's task a lot harder. The second is meeting the test of the fair-minded 
observer.  This  principle  applies  in  tandem  with  the  third,  which  is  the  double-
reasonableness  test.  Undoubtedly,  these  two  principles  combine  to  remove  the 
consideration of the issue of bias or the apprehension of bias from the subjective 
threshold into the more stringent objective standard category. As already shown, the 
applicants in De Lacy failed all three of these tests. And as the Constitutional Court 
held  in  Bernert,  the  presumption  of  impartiality  and  the  double-requirement  of 
reasonableness underscore the formidable nature of the burden resting upon the 
litigant who alleges bias or its apprehension. The idea is not to permit a disgruntled 
litigant to successfully complain of bias simply because the judicial officer has ruled 
against him or her. Nor should litigants be encouraged to believe that by seeking the 
disqualification of a judicial officer they will have their case heard by another judicial 
officer who is likely to decide the case in their favour.
103 We hasten to conclude that 
no better illustration of the foregoing than  De Lacy has graced the law reports in 
modern times. 
                                                 
103  Bernert para 35. See also The Citizen 1978 (Pty) Ltd v McBride 2011 ZACC 11 (8 April 2011) 
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